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This article examines the corporate accountability architecture governing virtual asset intermediaries in Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea. Drawing on gatekeeper theory and process-based regulation, it organises the governance duties imposed on intermediaries into three analytical tiers including prevention, detection and remedy, and evaluates the extent to which the resulting frameworks provide a complete accountability structure. The comparative analysis identifies a consistent pattern across all four jurisdictions: prevention duties are relatively developed and convergent, detection duties are more uneven and remedy mechanisms remain structurally weak. The article argues that this imbalance is not merely an implementation failure but a consequence of process-based governance itself, which focuses on regulating intermediary conduct rather than guaranteeing investor recovery. It identifies three categories of harm that existing frameworks inadequately address such as investor loss arising despite formal compliance, harm caused by actors outside the regulatory perimeter and systemic contagion without a clearly identifiable responsible actor. To address these gaps, the article proposes three recommendations including a statutory private right of action, intermediary liability mechanisms targeting regulated actors connected to unlicensed platforms and a mandatory compensation fund for cases in which no effective recovery pathway exists.
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Le et al. (2026) studied this question.
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