Politicisation of Judicial Appointments in Slovenia: De Constitutione Lata and de Constitutione Ferenda

Purpose: This article critically examines the system of judicial appointments in Slovenia and the proposed constitutional amendments intended to reform it. Drawing on the fundamental constitutional principles governingthe judiciary—the separation of powers, judicial independence, democracy and popular sovereignty—it analyses the existing constitutional and statutory framework and the proposed amendments. On this basis, it proposes a revised model of judicial appointments designed to guard against undue political influence and uphold judicial independence and impartiality. The article also provides a comparative legal analysis of the principal models of judicial appointment in Europe.Methodology: The research is based primarily on an analysis of the existing national constitutional and legislative framework, using established methods of legal interpretation, including linguistic, formal-logical and systematic approaches. This analysis is complemented by a review of relevant scholarly literature in constitutional law, constitutional procedureand state theory. The principal methodological approach is doctrinal, treating law as a normative system, while axiological and comparative methods are used to critically evaluate the existing and proposed arrangements. Historical and sociological methods provide contextual understanding and help identify the social and institutional factors shaping constitutional design.Findings: The author argues that Slovenia’s current system of judicial appointments is highly unusual from a comparative perspective and reflects the predominance of popular sovereignty. From the perspective of the separation of powers, however, it gives the legislature excessive influence and creates a risk of politicisation. A more balanced model, under which judges would be appointed either by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Judicial Council or directly by the Judicial Council,is therefore presented as a constitutionally more appropriate alternative. This model would strengthen the judiciary’s institutional position in relation to the legislature and executive, reduce the risk of politicisation and bring Slovenia’s system closer to those of other European states. The reform would thus have both practical and symbolic significance.Academic Contribution: Designing a system of judicial appointments requires careful balancing of the separation of powers, judicial independence and popular sovereignty. These principles are closely interconnected but may also conflict. The article argues that judicial appointments must be based on objective, pre-established and strictly professional, rather than political, criteria. It systematically and critically examines each stage of the process—nomination, selection and appointment—and proposes reforms to ensure that these constitutional principles are reflected in law and practice, taking account of comparative legal experience. In doing so, it contributes to constitutional scholarship, particularly the theory and practice of judicial organisation and governance.Originality and Significance: The article’s principal contribution to legal scholarship lies in its constitutional analysis and critical assessment of Slovenia’s judicial appointment system, and in its proposals for improving the rules governing judicial appointments. Its findings offer guidance to policymakers involved in constitutional and legislative reform, as well as to scholars and practitioners concerned with the theory and practice of judicial appointments.