The limits of resource-based middle-power leverage: Australia, uranium and nuclear non-proliferation, 1973–2013

Under what conditions can middle powers translate control over strategic resources into political influence? This article examines Australia's uranium diplomacy between 1973 and 2013, integrating middle-power theory and economic statecraft to distinguish diplomatic influence, institutional influence and behavioural leverage. Employing an embedded single-case study and process tracing, it argues that resource-based leverage depends on three interacting conditions: market power, institutional congruence and strategic alignment. It demonstrates that Australian uranium exports enhanced diplomatic standing and contributed to international safeguards standards but provides limited evidence that conditional supply independently changed recipients’ nuclear policies. The controversy over uranium exports to India illustrates how alternative suppliers, institutional exemptions and competing strategic priorities constrained Australian conditionality. The article demonstrates that institutional success and bilateral bargaining power need not coincide as internationalising national preferences can strengthen collective rules without increasing unilateral leverage. These findings qualify assumptions about resource-based influence and advance understanding of middle-power economic statecraft.