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Logic is typically understood as the study of valid inference. Consequently, a logic is generally identified with its set of valid inferences. However, this approach has some shortcomings. Notably, it fails to distinguish between certain important logics. Some have proposed focussing on higher-order valid inferences (that is, inferences between inferences) as a more refined criterion. We propose a change in perspective that broadens our understanding of logic. We aim to demonstrate that there are compelling reasons and significant benefits to considering not only valid inferences – regardless of their level – but also antivalid inferences. Examining antivalid inferences helps address the identification problem in logic. We also illustrate the benefits of attending to antivalid inferences through applications in the philosophy of logic. Finally, we provide a technical framework for treating such entities: a two-sided sequent calculus for antivalid inferences at arbitrary levels. This work aims to improve our understanding of logics by moving beyond validity.
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Erenfryd et al. (2026) studied this question.
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