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This paper studies time-inconsistent linear-quadratic mean-field games governed by stochastic evolution equations in Hilbert spaces. The time inconsistency arises through the dependence of the cost functional on the initial time, while the mean-field interaction enters through the mean of the state distribution. By employing a multiperson differential game approach, we show that the closed-loop equilibrium strategy admits an affine feedback representation characterized by an operator-valued Riccati equation and a novel coupled forward-backward equilibrium system. We establish the existence and uniqueness of mild solutions to the equilibrium system and hence the existence of a closed-loop equilibrium strategy.
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Hongjiang Qian (2026) studied this question.
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