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Housing presales provide construction-period funding but also expose buyers and lenders to noncompletion risk. This paper develops a project-finance model in which restrictions on early buyer funding increase the development loan required before completion, while bank pricing and a developer’s unobservable completion effort are jointly determined. China’s August 2026 housing reforms motivate the institutional setting, but the model addresses the more general financing trade-off created when advance customer funding is replaced by monitored project debt. Three results follow. First, stronger supervision and better recovery do not necessarily raise equilibrium completion probability: a larger debt burden can reduce the developer’s retained payoff and weaken effort enough to offset the direct monitoring gain. Second, financing access depends on the joint consistency of loan pricing, effort, participation, and underwriting; under sufficient conditions this generates a project-equity threshold. Third, expected credit loss separates into risk-quality, exposure, and selection effects, so a safer continuing project can coexist with greater loan exposure or a changing set of financed projects. Numerical illustrations show the effort-feedback reversal and the equity-access boundary. The framework clarifies why financing access and bank risk should be evaluated separately when presale funding is restricted.
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Wang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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