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This paper builds a common welfare architecture for legal permission rules in criminal law and competition law, and distinguishes throughout between doctrine it represents, normative premises it adopts, and results that follow from them. In criminal law, the received Japanese account on which an unlawful attacker’s interest forfeits protection is represented as a discount, bounded by the ratio of anticipated harms, on the harm borne by the source of a threat. Conditional on that representation, any incompleteness of the forfeiture reintroduces a balancing term of the same order; the three emergency justifications are distinguished by who bears the harm; and a defender’s prior provocation is separated from the attacker’s wrongfulness. In competition law, the paper models incentives to deliver benefits promised in green cooperation and derives a benchmark-specific threshold for cartel unsustainability. Both fields’ deterrence assessments share an untested assumption about substitution.
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Koki Arai (2026) studied this question.
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