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From the end of 2020, every new building in the European Union had to be a nearly zero-energy building (nZEB). Afterwards, new-dwelling prices grew faster than existing-dwelling prices in most countries. The European Central Bank linked part of this growth differential to energy costs and other factors. Its energy explanation is tested against a phase shift of new-dwelling prices (later recording or slower adjustment) and the cyclical sensitivity of existing dwellings, with country, cross-country, panel and event-study estimates for 26 Member States (without Greece). After correction for multiple testing, the differential shows no association with national energy indicators: energy prices, heating fuels, nZEB values and carbon intensity of electricity, which alone nears significance before correction. Much of the measured rise is a matter of timing. Between 2019–2021 and 2022–2025 the differential rose more where building permits fell more, consistent with a cyclical account, but the rise and this link largely disappear when new-dwelling prices are compared with existing-dwelling prices two or four quarters earlier. The contemporaneous differential thus overstates the lasting change in relative prices. The asymmetry itself is not new: in 2007–2014, before any nZEB requirement, existing dwellings fell further than new ones in most countries. The timing of national rate increases does not identify a credit channel. Energy premia are better estimated within the existing stock, and segment comparisons should allow for the phase shift.
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Szmit et al. (2026) studied this question.
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