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This paper studies falsification fraud, where a policy holder suffers a real loss that is excluded from coverage but reports it as covered. Without commitment to costly auditing, equilibrium features positive auditing and falsification, and contracts may exhibit either under‐ or overinsurance. We study two claims‐handling tools: pre‐audit screening and post‐audit payment reductions (“nitpicking”). Under CARA preferences, a sufficiently sensitive screening algorithm concentrates audits on flagged claims and lowers falsification, premiums, and equilibrium coverage; when sensitivity is low, these effects reverse. Nitpicking strengthens audit incentives by reducing payments on audited insurable claims, but its role diminishes as screening improves, implying substitution between the two tools. The welfare comparison between screening and no screening extends to general preferences, as does the weak welfare gain from allowing nitpicking. Numerical exercises under IARA and DARA preferences yield the same qualitative equilibrium patterns.
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Li et al. (2026) studied this question.
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