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This paper examines when withdrawal from an international organization increases or weakens state autonomy. By using the U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) as a theory-building case, it develops a function-level diagnostic framework based on two dimensions: institutional option value and autonomy cost. The framework distinguishes among option-preserving technical platforms, conditional reform functions, discretionary low-stakes activities, and autonomy-eroding commitments. Drawing on public documentary evidence, the paper identifies observed changes in U.S. institutional participation and examines four potential mechanisms through which broad withdrawal affects practical autonomy, which are information loss, rule-making vacancy, burden shifting, and credibility volatility. It distinguishes these observed changes from anticipated consequences that remain empirically uncertain. The paper also recognizes that political motivations for withdrawal differ from functional assessments and that selective participation depends on institutional rules and the feasibility of alternative arrangements. It contributes a differentiated understanding of institutional exit by showing how the same withdrawal decision expands formal discretion while potentially reducing valuable future policy options.
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Jing Ge (2026) studied this question.
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