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Firmware integrity and version control are important safeguards during the initialization of autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, the effectiveness of firmware-admission mechanisms depends not only on their security policies but also on whether those policies consistently enforce integrity requirements, rollback restrictions, and persistent-state protection. This study investigates the gap between stated security assumptions and actual admission behavior in a GPS-denied UAV environment. A fail-closed firmware-admission approach is examined through formal policy analysis and controlled experimental validation. The investigation identifies two critical weaknesses: acceptance of inadequately verified integrity metadata when a required secret is absent, and acceptance despite unsuccessful preservation of the previously trusted state. The revised mechanism addresses these weaknesses by enforcing mandatory trust configuration, independently evaluating firmware-version and rollback-counter constraints, and preserving accepted-state integrity when admission is rejected. Experimental findings demonstrate consistent rejection behavior under the evaluated conditions. The study contributes a more clearly defined and experimentally assessed software-level security boundary for UAV firmware admission. Its conclusions remain limited to the evaluated policy assumptions and do not establish hardware-backed firmware authenticity or resistance to privileged compromise.
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Md Shahanur Islam Shagor (2026) studied this question.
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