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This article reevaluates the U.S. role in Ngo Dinh Diem's appointment as prime minister of the State of Vietnam in 1954. It shows that Diem's ascent to high office stemmed as much from his ability to bypass U.S. covert machinations as it did from his capacity to exploit his U.S. connections. Although the contacts that Diem formed with influential U.S. officials were a factor in his appointment, the analysis here shows that Washington's most important contribution to Diem's rise to power came not from the decision to intervene in Vietnamese internal politics but from the choice not to do so. The Eisenhower administration's refusal to heed calls in May 1954 for covert intervention to establish a new government under a rival Vietnamese candidate, Nguyen Huu Tri, gave Diem time and leeway to make use of his superior domestic lobbying skills to outmaneuver his internal rivals and secure power. By reexamining Diem's rise to power, the article contributes to broader debates about U.S. power in the Third World during the Cold War and the legitimacy of the anti-Communist state that took shape in Vietnam.
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