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Contemporary democracies are increasingly threatened by political actors who transgress democratic norms to entrench their own power. When, if ever, is it democratically permissible to respond to such transgressions by reciprocating—that is, by deviating from democratic rules? A key concern is that this response risks triggering an escalating cycle of democratic transgressions, thereby severely eroding democratic norms. I argue that reciprocal deviations can instead play a central role in enforcing, and therefore preserving, democratic norms. Crucially, this enforcement rationale entails distinctive normative constraints on when, how, and by whom reciprocal deviations should be deployed—constraints which, I argue, diverge meaningfully from those recommended by other rationales for reciprocation. I then address two objections: that reciprocation is not needed to enforce democratic norms; and that my argument is overly idealized. While neither objection is decisive, each helps further specify the circumstances under which the present defense applies.
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Maxime Lepoutre (2026) studied this question.
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