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I challenge forms of social normativism that treat social normative entities—deontic statuses, deontic powers, and social norms—as indispensable to the explanation of action. I distinguish two roles these entities are said to play: causal and justificatory. Against the causal role, I argue that every causal explanation invoking social normative entities has a corresponding explanation that does not. Against the justificatory role, I argue that social scientists can adopt a methodological fictionalist stance toward justificatory explanations without thereby incurring ontological commitment. Realists therefore owe an account of why ontological commitment remains necessary for explanation.
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Erim Bakkal (2026) studied this question.
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