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Consumption vouchers condition public support on eligible purchases, but holders may convert their value into cash through fictitious transactions. This paper asks how a government should combine official redemption with enforcement when it values additional consumption and faces costly enforcement. In a model with heterogeneous purchase incentives, a higher redemption rate lowers the enforcement intensity required for complete deterrence but may draw subsidy-induced purchasers away from voucher use. Additional consumption depends on purchases displaced and consumption financed by redeemed cash. Programme payments need not rise because discounted redemption may replace a full-value subsidy. Within a fully deterring regime, the optimal rate balances these consumption and fiscal effects against savings in public enforcement expenditure and other control costs. The issuer’s control of a lawful outside option makes part of the enforcement burden endogenous to entitlement design, while the choice between administrative and criminal instruments requires a separate legal assessment.
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Ma et al. (2026) studied this question.
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