Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Fiscal pressure forces public healthcare systems to reduce waiting times via hospital competition, yet patients' bounded rationality weakens this policy. We develop a Hotelling-type queueing model that incorporates the strategic interaction between two budget-constrained public hospitals and patients with heterogeneous preferences and bounded rationality. Our analysis yields the following results. First, we show that bounded rationality can incentivize hospitals to increase service rates, thereby alleviating congestion and leading to an inverted-U relationship between patient welfare and the degree of bounded rationality. Moreover, the effect of bounded rationality on hospital revenue is also non-monotonic: when the capacity constraint is tight and the budget is sufficiently high, hospital revenue may be maximized at an intermediate level of bounded rationality rather than under full rationality. Second, higher reimbursement does not necessarily enhance patient welfare; instead, we identify an optimal reimbursement level that rises with the available public budget. Third, extending the framework to a multi-hospital environment within a Salop model shows that total market share, patient welfare, and hospital revenue are all maximized at a moderate level of competition. Overall, from a managerial perspective, healthcare managers should carefully account for patients' bounded rationality when designing capacity and information disclosure policies. Meanwhile, excessive hospital expansion may undermine both operational efficiency and financial sustainability. We further confirm the robustness of our main insights under alternative objectives (profit maximization and social welfare), systematic bias, heterogeneous hospital objectives, and other cost specifications.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Zhang et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: