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Physical-AI companies increasingly treat the data their robots stream home — joint angles, actuator torques, and the action sequences a policy emits — as the strategic fuel of the "data flywheel." Camera frames in these uploads are often redacted for privacy (faces blurred, pixels dropped). We show that this redaction creates a false sense of safety: the low-dimensional proprioceptive and action telemetry that is uploaded as-is, because it is assumed to be innocuous engineering data, leaks private information about the scene, the objects a robot handles, and the people around it. We demonstrate three attacks in high-fidelity physics simulation (MuJoCo; a Franka Panda arm and a mobile home robot):(A) from wrist/joint torque telemetry, an adversary recovers the mass of a grasped object to a median error of 2.7 g and classifies sealed medication packages into sensitive therapeutic categories (e.g. antidepressant, HIV PrEP, antipsychotic) with 94.5% accuracy;(B) from joint-angle telemetry alone, with the camera removed, an adversary recovers a typed keypad PIN with 71.1% exact-sequence and 86.3% per-digit accuracy;(C) from the action stream of a camera-conditioned navigation policy, with images deleted from the logs, an adversary infers whether the robot encountered a person (100% accuracy), the goal room (45.5% of 5 classes vs. 21.9% chance), and dead-reckons the route to recover the floor plan. The signal survives aggressive downsampling and sensor noise because it is rooted in the geometry and dynamics of motion, not in any single sample. We then present TeleDLP, a leakage-aware telemetry-release layer, and chart the privacy–utility trade-off using a concrete utility metric (behaviour cloning from the sanitised logs), so the cost of protection is explicit rather than assumed. TeleDLP's context-aware release reaches the same strong-privacy regime as uniform noise at roughly half the utility cost. Our results argue that robot telemetry content, not just the camera, must be governed as personal data. All experiments are in simulation; we discuss the sim-to-real gap and release no attack code.
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Ozyildirim et al. (2026) studied this question.
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