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Cloud infrastructures face a long-horizon threat from cryptographically relevant quantum computers, motivating both post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and quantum key distribution (QKD) as complementary defenses. QKD additionally offers a physical, information-theoretic signal of eavesdropping through the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the sifted key. Prior work has applied machine learning across the QKD pipeline, chiefly for parameter optimization and physical-layer stabilization, but has given less systematic attention to whether learned, distribution-aware statistics improve on a simple aggregate-QBER threshold for detecting partial intercept-resend eavesdropping in a cloud key-rotation setting. We simulate BB84 key exchange under uniform and time-concentrated (“bursty”) partial interception across two monitoring-window lengths, and compare a static aggregate-QBER threshold against a logistic-regression detector that additionally uses block-wise QBER variance and maxima, at a matched false-positive rate. Across all four tested conditions, the aggregate threshold matched or exceeded the block-wise detector, while monitoring-window length had a substantially larger, quantifiable effect on detection sensitivity than the choice of detector. For this attack model, cloud QKD key-management pipelines therefore gain more from shortening or adaptively sizing the QBER monitoring window than from adding distributional machine-learning features to the detection statistic, which also helps explain why reported machine-learning gains in QKD concentrate in parameter optimization rather than eavesdropping detection Keywords: machine learning; Quantum Key Distribution; BB84; eavesdropping detection; quantum bit error rate; cloud security
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Akheel Mohammad (2026) studied this question.
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