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Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology opposes radical scepticism by debunking rather than refutation. Drawing on Coliva, Moyal-Sharrock, Pritchard, Schönbaumsfeld, and Stroll, this paper distinguishes five Wittgensteinian debunking strategies. On them, the sceptic says nothing and doubts nothing, presupposes what she dismisses, misclassifies the framework, mistakes conceivability for possibility, and demands an evaluation that cannot coherently be had. The paper then asks whether each strategy transfers to scepticism about a putative religious hinge, taken here as commitment to the personal God of the evidential debate. The strongest debunking fails to transfer, because religious doubt is genuine by Wittgenstein’s own criteria. The self-refutation argument transfers only within theistically hinged practices. The category-mistake and illusion-of-possibility arguments transfer as tools that discipline atheology and natural theology alike. What survives is a qualified religious hinge epistemology.
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Zoheir Bagheri Noaparast (2026) studied this question.
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