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We analyze two publicly available specifications of matrix-obfuscation protocols for secure computation. A shared product of input masks exposes exact linear measurements of the private inputs. For the standalone two-party message flow, a simple dichotomy gives a constant distinguishing gap for every input-independent mask law under an input-independent output-pad law. Rank deficiency leaves an affine ambiguity for unrestricted matrices but does not protect inputs confined to a known low-dimensional subspace. Applying this observation to the repeated-block embedding in S2PHP gives polynomial-time, single-execution recovery of an entire private input vector under explicit, efficiently testable rank conditions. A second attack recovers the product of the two other parties' inputs in the square S3PM protocol under invertibility conditions. We provide equal-output distinguishing examples, finite-field success probabilities under a specified mask distribution, and an application-level extension: passive recovery of repeated training batches through the forward cross-products of S2PLoRT. The latter is reproduced in a complete specification-level training loop on synthetic and public benchmark inputs, with explicit numerical and sampler limitations. A balanced-label construction also gives identical authorized final-share distributions under an explicit input-independent pad law in exact real arithmetic. All attacks are passive and use one participant's prescribed view, without collusion, mask reuse, or access to a commodity server. The results apply to the stated arXiv versions and do not establish an exploit against any deployed implementation.
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Chandan Kumar Shukla (2026) studied this question.
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