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The paper examines the Securities and Exchange Board of India's (SEBI) consultation paper dated 30 June 2026, which proposes a uniform requirement of 75% investor consent by value and three alternative voting methodologies: deemed consent, present-and-voting and express voting. The research problem is whether a common numerical threshold can produce consistent investor protection when the counting methodology determines what the threshold measures. The paper uses doctrinal analysis to compare the applicable regulatory framework and the consultation paper, supplemented by comparative analysis of other SEBI-regulated vehicles, along with Company Law. SEBI's own illustration demonstrates that identical investor responses may produce approval rates of 90%, 75% or 30% under the three methodologies, so that the outcome is decided by the treatment of investor silence, rather than the threshold. The paper therefore argues that uniformity of threshold does not necessarily produce uniformity in the level of investor participation required for approval. It concludes by proposing a calibrated consent framework in which voting methodology, threshold and procedural safeguards correspond to the materiality and conflict implications of the decision.
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Bhawna Tanwar & Parthivi Garv (2026) studied this question.
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