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Why did Ukraine succeed in AI-enabled defense innovation against a better-resourced Russia? Applying the knowledge problem to the development of military technologies, we argue that the answer is institutional. Militaries lack the prices and profit-and-loss signals that coordinate dispersed knowledge in markets. Yet militaries must still determine which technologies units need, how to develop those technologies, and how to employ them in combat. Ukraine answered this problem through polycentric defense innovation, in which independent centers experiment, compete, and feed results into the next iteration. In Ukraine, these centers included volunteer networks, frontline units, drone workshops, start-ups, and foreign partners that identified needs, built solutions, and refined them through battlefield feedback. The state supplied capital and removed regulatory friction. This polycentric arrangement brought dispersed knowledge to bear through co-production and competition, and left the system robust to the failure of any single center. Ukraine’s success rested on post-2014 decentralization reform, crowdfunded civic defense, transparent procurement, and a mature technology sector. Russia’s monocentric model, by contrast, could scale systems the center had chosen but could not discover new ones from below. Polycentric arrangements nonetheless entail limitations of their own. Artificial intelligence processes information without supplying the situated judgment that war requires, and its opacity weakens the competitive feedback that disciplines dispersed procurement.
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Zhukov et al. (2026) studied this question.
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