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The Asymmetry in population ethics holds that creating a miserable person is morally impermissible, while not creating a happy person is morally permissible, all else being equal. Harm‐avoidance theories explain the Asymmetry by claiming that, in certain contexts, only actions resulting in harm are impermissible. Two problems threaten these theories: (i) The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance—requiring agents to avoid creating improvable good lives—and (ii) requiring dominated options. Sophisticated harm‐avoidance theories avoid both problems. However, we show that any harm‐avoidance theory entails either (1) a worse form of The Problem of Improvable Life Avoidance, (2) a troubling form of sadism, (3) an implausibly extreme priority for avoiding a small harm for one person over greater harms for many people, or (4) spurious prohibition dilemmas. Furthermore, we argue that any reasonable theory of the Asymmetry entails at least one of (1)–(4).
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Campbell et al. (2026) studied this question.
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