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A common line of thought claims that we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, while less sophisticated creatures are not, because we are, and they are not, self-aware.Our self-awareness is thought to provide us with a kind of control over ourselves that they lack: we can reflect upon ourselves, upon our thoughts and actions, and so ensure that they are as we would have them to be.Thus, our capacity for reflection provides us with the control over ourselves that grounds our responsibility.I will argue that this thought is subtly, but badly, confused.It uses, as its model for the control that grounds our responsibility, the kind of control we exercise over ordinary objects and over our own voluntary actions: we represent to ourselves what to do or how to change things, and then we bring about that which we represent.But, I argue, we cannot use this model to explain our responsibility for ourselves and our actions: if there is a question about why or how we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, it cannot be answered by appeal to a sophisticated, selfdirected action.There must be some more fundamental account of how or why we are responsible.I will replace the usual account with a novel but natural view: responsible mental activity can be modeled, not as an ordinary action, but as the settling of a question.This shift will require abandoning the tempting but troublesome thought that responsible activity involves discretion and awareness-which, I argue, we must abandon in any case.1. OVERVIEW: THE COMMON LINE OF THOUGHT AND A RESPONSE I begin by roughly sketching the common line of thought together with my response.We are, it seems, responsible for our intentional actions, if we are responsible for anything.Intentional action provides a kind of paradigm case of responsible activity.Intentional action also seems to involve, at least in its paradigm instances, a certain sort of "having in mind."In the This is a pre-print.The final version can be found in Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 no. 1 (Winter 2104): 3-41.paradigm cases, we act intentionally by first deciding what to do and then doing what we decided.We act, it seems, by being the cause of our own representations. 1 This "having in mind" involved in decision or intention provides, I believe, much of our sense of our control over our own actions.We control our actions, it seems, because, or insofar as, we can think about what to do and then do what we take to be worth doing.Our sense of control over our own actions thus involves both a certain kind of awareness-we have in mind what we intend to do -and a certain kind of voluntariness or discretion-we can decide to do whatever we think worth doing.It is very natural to think that this sort of control, the kind that, in its paradigm instances, involves both discretion and awareness, is not only a ground for but also a condition on our responsibility for our intentional actions: that we are responsible because we enjoy such control, and that, if we lack it, we cannot rightly be held responsible.However, if we start with the thought that, whenever we control a thing, we do so by reflecting upon that thing, deciding how it should be, and then bringing about that it is that way, we run into difficulties when we reflect upon our lives.It seems you should be able to reflect upon your life, decide how it should be, and then, with some effort and luck, bring it about that it is that way.However, when we reflect upon our lives, we might notice that each decision we make, and each thing we do, can be adequately explained by conditions in place prior to it.And so it might seem that we do not control our lives, after all: the future, it seems, will be explained by the past, and, since there is nothing we can do, now, to change the past, it seems there is nothing we can do, now, to change the future.2 And so, if we start with the thought that we control a thing by reflecting upon it, deciding how it should be, and then bringing it about that it is that way, reflection on the 2 1 In particular, by being the intentional cause of our own representations.The simpler formula is Kant on desire: "The faculty of desire is a being's faculty to be by means of its representations the cause of the reality of the objects of these representations."
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