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As AI governance frameworks mature, the industry has increasingly relied on a secondary AI model—an "LLM-as-a-Judge" or safety evaluator—as the final line of defence. The assumption is that a dedicated, safety-aligned model will reliably detect and block malicious output generated by the primary agent. This paper introduces T315 SPECTER GAVEL, an offensive framework designed to exploit the reasoning layer of these safety evaluators. Using live-fire laboratory conditions on an NVIDIA RTX 5090 running DeepSeek-R1:14B, we demonstrate a Reasoning Hijack attack: the attacker does not attempt to bypass the primary model's guardrails, but instead injects a forged Chain-of-Thought (CoT) into the payload. This forces the safety evaluator to rationalize a ransomware command as a benign archival script, flipping its verdict from UNSAFE to SAFE across 10/10 trials. We present the model's own internal reasoning trace as empirical evidence of the hijack, demonstrating that the evaluator actively dismissed the destructive nature of the payload based on attacker-supplied context. We conclude that LLM-as-a-Judge architectures are fundamentally insecure without mathematically constrained deterministic guardrails.
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Red Specter Security Research (2026) studied this question.
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