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Outbreaks in conflict-affected settings make demands that preparedness frameworks may not meet. The 2026 Bundibugyo Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), declared a public health emergency of international concern on 17 May 2026, is unfolding where more than 2 million people are forcibly displaced. We examined how far policy instruments address outbreak response in such settings, and where responsibility for conflict-specific functions is assigned. In this comparative document analysis, documents were identified through 202 logged searches, mainly of continental, global, humanitarian and national issuers’ repositories, and from the reference list of an initial analysis. Documents current on 30 June 2026 were rated strong, partial or absent on nine domains against an explicit rubric, with an extract for every rating; French documents were coded in French. A second author independently coded 20 randomly sampled documents. Category ratings took the highest level of any document, with the modal level as a sensitivity analysis. Of 150 documents screened, 63 were included. Of 567 document-domain ratings, 75 (13.2%) were strong and 108 (19.0%) absent. Agreement between coders was 73% (kappa 0.51), and 93% for strong against other ratings (kappa 0.78). Strong ratings made up 30% of ratings in operational guidance and 36% in four instruments issued for the outbreak, against 3% in standing strategies, plans and laws and none in four IHR (2005) monitoring reports; the contrast held in sensitivity analyses. Eight documents included displaced people in surveillance through a specified mechanism; none of the five DRC national documents retrieved did so. In retrieved documents, no continental or national body was made responsible for surveillance in areas outside state control, and none assigned delivery of investigational countermeasures in insecure areas. Conflict-specific provisions exist, but they sit mainly in operational and humanitarian guidance and time-limited outbreak plans, and rarely in the standing continental, national and IHR (2005) instruments that frame preparedness; responsibility for several functions is unassigned at the interfaces between levels. Implementing the Africa Health Security and Sovereignty Agenda and revising national plans and IHR (2005) monitoring tools could assign owners for provisions that humanitarian instruments already contain.
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Osborne et al. (2026) studied this question.
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