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This paper examines local government growth by analyzing how municipalities respond to increases in taxing autonomy and whether their responses are conditioned on voter preferences. Specifically, we investigate the fiscal impact of home rule when the shift to home rule status (HRS) is independent of voter preferences versus when voters adopt home rule. We find that home rule has no effect on tax collections when changes in HRS are unrelated to voter preferences. However, the tax structure shifts to one that more closely aligns with the preferences of the median voter. In contrast, when voters select into HRS there is a significant and sustained increase in tax revenues that is driven by increases in property and sales taxes. These findings indicate that local fiscal policy is responsive to the preferences of the median voter.
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