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Foundations and Methodology of Cross-Cultural Philosophical Comparison This paper examines a fundamental problem in cross-cultural philosophy: the mistaken assumption that similar or identical translated terms necessarily represent equivalent philosophical concepts. Such assumptions can obscure differences in meaning, referent, scope, theoretical foundations, and historical development, thereby affecting the validity of philosophical comparison. Drawing on classical Buddhist, Confucian, Daoist, and Aristotelian texts, the study first examines the different philosophical meanings associated with the middle, including Aristotle's mesotēs and Chinese expressions such as zhongdao (中道) and zhongyong (中庸). It then investigates the conceptual distinctions among Dao (道), de (德), li (禮), Aristotle's aretē (ἀρετή), and hexis (ἕξις). These analyses demonstrate why linguistic correspondence and apparent similarities in ethical practice cannot, by themselves, establish conceptual equivalence. On this basis, the paper develops a methodology for cross-cultural philosophical comparison involving three essential steps: independently identifying each concept within its original philosophical context; establishing a specific and justified dimension of comparison; and evaluating conceptual correspondence, differences, and the limits of comparability. The paper argues that recognizing philosophical differences is as significant as identifying similarities. By grounding comparison in the independent understanding of its objects, it offers a framework for more rigorous and meaningful dialogue across philosophical traditions.
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Hu-Yang Qingyun (2026) studied this question.
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