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Population loss in Chinese cities raises a question for environmental oversight: who keeps pressing polluters and local officials when residents leave? Drawing on exit–voice theory, we argue that out-migration removes the residents best able to voice environmental demands and weakens pressure on polluters, both directly and through local government. We match census-aligned annual resident population for prefecture-level cities to the environmental investment of heavy-polluting listed firms from 2011 to 2023. Environmental investment falls when a city enters shrinkage and remains lower in the following years, and the probability of investing drops by about 7.5 percentage points. The decline is concentrated in net out-migration; the estimate for natural decrease is close to zero. Productivity, revenue growth, and total capital expenditure show no detectable change, whereas the environmental share of capital expenditure falls. Public attention to pollution declines, and so does local government environmental attention, contrary to the rise predicted by Tiebout competition. After China’s central environmental protection inspection teams began accepting residents’ complaints directly, the investment decline narrowed by more than a quarter, and the narrowing outlasted the teams’ stay. Environmental governance in shrinking cities therefore needs oversight channels that do not depend on the number of local residents.
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Qu et al. (2026) studied this question.
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