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Margin requirements are judged by how much forced liquidation they prevent, but they also shape who is liquidated. Futures margins cap leverage before positions are opened and trigger margin calls afterwards, so a margin change acts differently on traders bound by the margin cap and on traders bound by their own leverage limits. We model speculators and leveraged arbitrageurs interacting through margin calls and price impact, derive margin-call thresholds analytically, and evaluate results over 100 points of a 16-dimensional parameter space. Client records from a Chinese futures brokerage show directional concentration and anchor the margin rates studied. Cutting the margin rate from 8% to 4% raises liquidation at every point, almost entirely among margin-bound arbitrageurs, without improving pricing. Raising it to 20% shifts liquidation to speculators bound by their own limits and reduces it at most points; mispricing becomes more frequent within 100 periods but less frequent over 500. Switching off the feedback loops shows that the analytical thresholds predict who is liquidated, while the fire-sale loop drives the price consequences. When the constraint configuration is sampled, liquidation migrates towards whichever group’s binding constraint a margin increase tightens. Margin policy should be assessed by whose leverage constraint it tightens.
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Chao et al. (2026) studied this question.
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