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States that face political crisis must decide not only how to respond, but how far the response should go and possibly how it can alter the arrangements through which they govern. This distinction matters because institutional activity can be extensive without in itself redistributing strategic authority. Governments may however introduce new procedures, create consultative forums or assign additional responsibilities to subnational institutions, while still retaining the established relationships that coordinate those changes. It is in this light that Adaptation and transformation are however related, but to a greater extent are not interchangeable outcomes. The rationale of this article is to develop and demonstrate that distinction through Cameroon’s response to the Anglophone crisis between 2016 and 2025. It does this by examining three forms of state responses: securitised intervention, the Major National Dialogue of 2019, and the decentralisation reforms that introduced a special status for the North-West and South-West Regions, with each of these responses involving a change in the state’s governing repertoire. Furthermore, the legal reforms introduced in particular, created differentiated regional institutions and additional competences, such that the argument is no more about if nothing changed or changed but rather, the question is whether if these changes substantially reorganised the relationships through which strategic authority and administrative coordination were exercised. The article brings State Governance Logic (SGL) into conversation with historical institutionalism and scholarship on state capability, with SGL directing attention to the inherited institutional relationships through which political pressures are interpreted and translated into action. It is in this sense that adaptive statecraft is used, in the bid to describe the practical work of modifying governing responses within those conditions. Institutional transformation, by contrast, requires evidence of a substantial change in the distribution of authority, discretion, resources or coordination. The analysis identifies a recurring pattern of bounded adaptation: even where new instruments and institutions are introduced, they remain embedded in a constitutional and administrative architecture that continued to affirm the primacy of the central state. This work is therefore a theory-building interpretation of documentary evidence, not a claim that the formal record alone can establish every dimension of implementation.
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Professor Alain Nako Kofele Martin (2026) studied this question.
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