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Against global food‑security pressure and agricultural‑market restructuring, the “Insurance + Futures” scheme has become a vital tool for agricultural risk mitigation. Institutional differences, between China’s government‑led pilot model and the market‑oriented long‑statute system in the United States, lead to distinct hedging‑efficiency outcomes. Based on institutional‑evolution theory, this paper adopts Super‑SBM‑DEA, two‑way fixed‑effects regression and Monte‑Carlo VaR measurement, and conducts an empirical study using bilateral panel data from 2020 to 2024. The results show that the US model achieves more stable and higher hedging efficiency. Four institutional factors including subsidy continuity, market completeness, farm‑operation scale and risk‑guarantee breadth significantly improve hedging performance. Market‑oriented rules strengthen efficiency gains in the US, while China’s administrative‑dominated pilots produce institutional friction and efficiency losses. Targeted policy suggestions are proposed to promote China’s “Insurance + Futures” transformation from scattered pilots to standardized long‑term operation.
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Kezhen Huang (2026) studied this question.
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