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Understanding how people decide whether someone or something possesses a mind is central to a myriad of psychological, biological, and philosophical questions. It shapes fundamental processes at the individual (e.g., social interaction) and societal level (e.g., morality and ethics). While mind perception has been studied, it remains unclear which internal model people use when ascribing mental capacities to entities. Across four experiments (total N = 256), we explored what model people hold and its flexibility when ascribing agency and experience to entities encountered in everyday life and which differ in animacy and socialness (e.g., humans, pets, robots, voice assistants, tools). Using representational similarity analysis combined with lab-based experiments, a 6-wk long social interaction intervention, and longitudinal real-life exposure, we tested which model people use to ascribe agency and experience by comparing observed rating data to theoretical models. We demonstrated that an animacy distinction underlies the representational structure of experience attributions, while internal models for agency attributions are more idiosyncratic and flexible. When receiving explicit information on one entity, the internal model of agency changes. People update their model by incorporating this information, generalizing across the entire category of entities. We found no evidence that extended exposure to or ownership of inanimate technology, such as robots or voice assistants, or pets leads to restructuring of the models for experience or agency. Overall, these results provide insight into the internal models people hold when perceiving minds, the flexibility thereof, and offer ways to understand the roots and consequences of mind perception.
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Held et al. (2026) studied this question.
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