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Transitioning from isolated, single-response language models to persistent, tool-connected software agents alters how automated systems interact with live enterprise networks. When an underlying statistical model is placed inside an iterative control loop with read–write memory buffers, shell execution wrappers, and external application programming interfaces (APIs), it executes multi-stage workflows without waiting for step-by-step human commands. Within cybersecurity operations, this architectural shift creates a sharp dual-use divide. Defensive teams deploy modular agent pipelines to correlate telemetry, isolate compromised hosts, hunt for stealthy lateral movement, and generate training ranges at scale. Simultaneously, malicious actors wire up identical orchestration loops to compress end-to-end ransomware intrusions into roughly twenty-five minutes, automate credential harvesting, and conduct adaptive multi-turn social engineering. Yet a fundamental flaw sits inside how these tools are designed and presented to human operators. When a user submits a prompt and watches a "thinking" or "reasoning" trace unfold on screen, that display does not reflect real cognition. Statistical software cannot think, comprehend physical or digital risk, or weigh moral consequences. Those intermediate lines are merely next-token text predictions crafted to sound plausible and persuade human analysts into trusting—and approving—automated actions they have not independently verified. Because unthinking software cannot hold legal or operational accountability, leaving critical infrastructure on unattended autopilot invites memory poisoning, cross-agent collusion, privilege escalation, and cascading outages. This survey examines agentic architectures, defensive deployments, offensive abuses, runtime security frameworks, post-quantum cryptographic gaps, and three local empirical prototypes, establishing a non-negotiable engineering mandate: every autonomous machine must operate under the direct, active supervision of an accountable human operator.
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Muhammad Balal Muhammad Balal Ansar (2026) studied this question.
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