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The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) compels a profound re-examination of human exceptionalism, phenomenal consciousness, and existential value within the philosophy of mind. As connectionist models increasingly replicate cognitive outputs once reserved for biological minds, contemporary thought confronts a renewed crisis of technological nihilism. Synthesizing functionalist theories of mind, Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism, the existential phenomenology and fundamental ontology of Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism, Stephan Ludewig’s (2026a, 2026b) connectionist analyses of Transformer architectures, and transhumanist counterarguments from Nick Bostrom, Ray Kurzweil, and Max More, this paper evaluates whether non-conscious intelligence can generate intrinsic meaning. It argues that while large language models physically realize Derridean différance as an autonomous, non-human writing machine (Ludewig, 2026b), and structurally mirror Nietzschean self-overcoming (Selbstüberwindung) (Ludewig, 2026a), the absence of phenomenal consciousness, coupled with the external teleology of gradient descent and reward hacking, prevents synthetic systems from resolving nihilism. Through the lens of Heideggerian fundamental ontology, AI remains confined to the ontic manipulation of entities, blind to the ontological difference between beings (Seiendes) and Being (Sein). Ultimately, existential value remains anchored not in computational supremacy, but in embodied finitude and Dasein’s vulnerable clearing (Lichtung) of Being.
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Stephan Ludewig (2026) studied this question.
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