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Frontier artificial intelligence models can now accelerate vulnerability discovery, exploit development, and long-horizon cyber operations. This can seriously compress cyber risk, where faster actionable exploitation outpaces effective remediation and wider access enables more actors to operate within that interval. This article asks whether existing cybercrime and cybersecurity rules remain sufficient when a provider’s release decision can alter the threat environment before any offence or reportable incident occurs. It conducts a doctrinal, comparative, and functional analysis of United States, European Union, and Saudi Arabian law, read against model evaluations, deployment practices, and incidents, selectively updated through 15 October 2026. The analysis finds an emerging but incomplete upstream layer: voluntary US federal access coexists with binding Californian governance, EU systemic-risk duties and scoped Saudi preventive controls. Residual gaps concern coverage, evidence, and release-specific procedures. The article proposes a jurisdiction-adaptable legislative design combining serious cyber capability and foreseeable exposure with confidential notification, assessment, mitigation and differentiated access. Coercive restrictions require stronger evidence, proportionate justification and review; once model weights have been distributed beyond the provider’s control, they cannot reliably be recalled. Properly bounded by evidence, confidentiality and due process, pre-release governance would complement cybercrime enforcement, product security, and critical-infrastructure resilience.
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Federico Fusco (2026) studied this question.
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