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This essay examines the relation between the thinking subject and its own existence, asking whether self-presence precedes particular acts of thought without constituting an uninterrupted act of cognition. Beginning with the misleading impression that thinking never ceases, it distinguishes Descartes’s epistemological cogito from the ontological priority of the subject who thinks. Drawing on Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, the essay distinguishes habitual self-knowledge from actual self-knowing. Self-presence is neither a hidden intellectual operation nor an additional constituent of the soul. It names the soul’s essence considered as present to its own intellect, the standing condition from which actual self-knowledge can arise. The essay also revises earlier claims concerning the identity of knowing and being, the relation between soul and person, and the nature of intellectual activity after death. Within the Gaitan Topology, it advances a conditional proposition: if creaturely existence is received, then the intellectual subject’s self-presence, belonging to its constitution rather than being produced through reflection, is received with existence itself. This application extends the corpus’s account of creaturely dependence without offering an independent proof of divine grounding. It leaves open how such a non-eventive constitutive condition belongs to the continuant through temporal succession.
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Oscar Gaitan (2026) studied this question.
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