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Nordic states have long promoted regional cooperation in the Arctic through dialogue, development and the notion of Arctic exceptionalism – the expectation that the region could remain insulated from wider geopolitical rivalry. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the growing militarisation of the High North, however, have undermined this premise and exposed the strategic constraints facing small states. This article examines how Nordic states respond to heightened great-power competition when their limited capacity to shape international outcomes is compounded by dependence on stronger partners. Drawing on small-state theory, the article argues that Nordic security strategies reflect neither simple balancing nor passive adaptation, but strategic maneuvering within and beyond existing alliances. By integrating Nordicness through coordinated capabilities, military mobility and Arctic infrastructure, the Nordic states seek to compensate for their limited individual capabilities, strengthen their collective material power, and retain strategic autonomy. Their response is shaped by Russian regional forcefulness and U.S. strategic expectations, while broader partnerships with Canada and European allies enhance their institutional power and political agency within the Arctic security order. The article thus addresses a gap in the literature by showing how Nordic security cooperation and diversified partnerships can enhance small-state strategic autonomy and agency in the Arctic.
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Nir Levitan (2026) studied this question.
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