Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Large-scale mining investment in Zambia has repeatedly promised customary landholders compensation, employment, and infrastructure in exchange for the loss of their land. This article compares two chiefdoms shaped by that bargain: Musele Chiefdom in Kalumbila District, North-Western Province, host to First Quantum Minerals’ Sentinel copper mine, and Chiwala Chiefdom on the Copperbelt, where cement- and limestone-related investment has displaced customary landholders over the past decade and a half. One operator, Dangote Cement Zambia, is firmly documented there; a further, smaller project is reported but not independently confirmed. Drawing on the Social Licence to Operate framework and the International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standard 5, the article traces how resettlement agreements negotiated between investors and traditional authorities translate, or fail to translate, into durable livelihood restoration and community acceptance. It argues that a single, capital-intensive operator negotiating with one chieftaincy and a more fragmented pattern of smaller investments produce markedly different patterns of accountability, even where the underlying promises remain much the same: concentration brings independent scrutiny but concentrates risk within a single relationship, while fragmentation disperses that risk but also disperses the accountability needed to correct it. The article situates its findings within Zambia’s evolving resettlement policy framework, including the Revised National Resettlement Policy of 2024 and the Resettlement Management Bill of 2026, and argues for a middle path between customary authority and statutory regulation that neither romanticises chiefly gatekeeping nor displaces it entirely
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Clive M. Noombo (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: