Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Why do some governments adopt stringent climate policies despite the electoral risks? While existing research emphasises the role of institutions in enabling ambitious climate action, it often overlooks the agency of elected politicians in navigating intra-cabinet conflicts and how different modes of bargaining affect policy output. Taking the case of the housing sector, where climate policy costs can spark backlash, this article examines how cabinet governance, especially mechanisms of conflict resolution, shapes the adoption of stringent climate regulations. Applying process tracing to Germany’s heating law to phase out fossil fuel heating (2023) and France’s minimum energy performance standards for rentals (2021), the study finds two different pathways through which the agency of politicians enables stringent climate policy. The article contributes to the literature by providing a more granular account of how institutions such as cabinet governance shape policy outcomes by conditioning the strategies available to elected politicians.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Nina Lopez-Uroz (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 8 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: