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Digital transformation requires substantial upfront commitments whose payoffs are delayed and uncertain, which makes it particularly exposed to the time horizons of top managers. Drawing on upper echelons and agency perspectives, this study examines whether, through which investment channels, and under which governance conditions managerial myopia affects firm-level digital transformation, using 18,495 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2022. Managerial myopia is measured by rule-based textual analysis of the Management Discussion and Analysis, and digital transformation by the share of digital assets in total intangible assets. Empirically, managerial myopia is significantly and negatively associated with digital transformation. This result holds under an Oster bounds test, a Bartik-type instrumental variable, system GMM, a Heckman selection correction, and alternative measures and fixed-effects structures. Mechanism tests show that myopia is not associated with lower investment. Instead, myopic managers expand total investment and capital expenditure and are more likely to overinvest; the capital-expenditure and, more weakly, overinvestment channels carry significant negative indirect effects, whereas the larger investment scale partly offsets them, pointing to misallocation rather than underinvestment. Higher cash compensation intensity and, contrary to the incentive-alignment prediction, greater managerial equity exposure intensify the negative effect. The effect is weaker in firms with medium than with low female executive representation, but continuous and threshold specifications provide no evidence of nonlinear moderation. The effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned and financially constrained firms.
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Huang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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