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The paper investigates how adaptation research and development (R&D) and knowledge spillovers affect the formation and stability of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) in a dynamic framework. Adaptation is modeled as a knowledge-based public good generated through cooperative R&D, with knowledge fully shared within the coalition and only imperfectly spilling over to non-members. We formulate an infinite horizon differential game in which countries simultaneously choose emissions and adaptation investments, whereas pollution and adaptation knowledge evolve over time. The open-loop Nash equilibrium is characterized analytically, yielding explicit steady-state solutions for emissions, pollution, adaptation investments and knowledge stocks. The local dynamic properties of the equilibrium are then investigated through a stability analysis and its saddle-path properties are assessed numerically for the parameter configurations considered. Comparative statics reveal how coalition size, adaptation effectiveness, knowledge spillovers, environmental vulnerability, R&D costs and knowledge depreciation jointly influence the long-run equilibrium. The numerical analysis demonstrates that the model generates not only the conventional small stable coalitions commonly found in the IEA literature, but also intermediate self-enforcing coalitions and, under suitable parameter configurations, the grand coalition. Stable coalition size is shown to depend on the balance between the technological benefits of cooperative adaptation and the incentives to free ride on shared knowledge. More effective adaptation technologies enlarge stable coalitions, whereas stronger knowledge spillovers, higher cooperative R&D costs and faster knowledge depreciation reduce participation incentives. The results highlight that adaptation policies may simultaneously strengthen international cooperation and generate moral hazard by weakening mitigation incentives. Overall , the paper shows that the interaction between adaptation knowledge and coalition formation substantially enlarges the range of self-enforcing international environmental agreements as well as the coexistence of medium and large coalitions compared with standard dynamic models.
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Biancardi et al. (2026) studied this question.
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