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This paper presents a modal logic of conditional intention. By conditional intention we understand a contingent commitment to an action that depends on the knowledge of whether means or reasons for the action obtain. The notion is studied in several philosophical [17, 32] and legal-theoretical papers [11, 24, 40], where it is shown to be crucial for practical reasoning. While several modal logics of unconditional intention were developed [4, 13, 15, 27, 35], the conditional intention is overlooked by modal logicians. The paper contains both philosophical and mathematical-logical contributions to the problem. From the philosophical side, we show that several rationality norms of conditional belief and axioms for logics of conditionals should be rejected for the logic of conditional intention. From the technical side, we propose a new axiom system and prove that it is sound, complete, and has a finite model property with respect to a special class of Kripke models equipped with a set-selection function.
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Daniil Khaitovich (2026) studied this question.
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