Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Private set intersection (PSI) allows two parties to learn the intersection of their input sets without revealing any non-matching elements, and underlies applications such as private contact discovery, password-breach detection, and illegal-content detection. Recent state-of-the-art PSI protocols follow a vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE) and oblivious key-value store (OKVS) paradigm. While highly efficient, this approach inherits the algorithmic and implementation complexity of OKVS. In this work, we propose a lightweight paradigm based solely on VOLE. Our protocol separates a VOLE phase, which generates all required correlations, from a simple PSI phase that consumes these correlations directly, avoiding any OKVS encoding or decoding. We formally prove its security in both semi-honest and malicious models. Experimental results show that our construction achieves up to 3.7× speedup over state-of-the-art PSI in the LAN setting and up to 2.3× in the WAN setting. The malicious extension adds an average running-time overhead of 15.40% and an average communication overhead of 22.84% across the evaluated settings.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jiang et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 8 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: