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The contrast between Plato and Aristotle is often portrayed as a choice between transcendent Forms and immanent natural beings. This article argues that the more productive issue is the relation between phenomenal intelligibility and ontological completeness. Explanatory success does not by itself establish that a framework's ontology exhausts reality; conversely, explanatory incompleteness is not evidence for a hidden essence. I develop critical ontological openness as a discipline of explanatory jurisdiction: specifying the domain, standards, and warrant of a claim before extending it into a comprehensive metaphysical assertion. Any inference from explanatory success to ontological exhaustiveness requires four bridging premises—closure, literalness, uniqueness, and fundamentality—which I test across physical theory, consciousness, behaviourism, vitalism, and ontic structural realism. Finally, I trace a parallel boundary from description to evaluation in ethics and politics, showing how Plato and Aristotle serve as complementary checks against treating the given as final or a posited beyond as explanatory.
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David (Daoud) Matta (2026) studied this question.
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