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Safety investigations operate at the intersection of human factors engineering and legal accountability, yet these domains are rarely examined jointly. While human factors methods prioritize system reliability and organizational learning, legal frameworks demand investigations that satisfy statutory thresholds of reasonableness and causation. This article bridges this gap by presenting an integrated Sociotechnical‐Legal Framework for event analysis. Employing a critical legal analysis and narrative literature review, the study examines the alignment between 17 Australian health and safety statutes and 16 common investigation tools (including AcciMap, ICAM, and STAMP‐CAST). The findings confirm an absence of prescriptive investigative methodology under Australian law, compounded by jurisdictional divergence in the definitions of “accident,” “incident,” and “event,” as well as competing statutory risk standards: So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFAIRP), As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP), and As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). To illustrate practical application, two Australian case studies demonstrate how systems‐based methods support regulatory compliance and satisfy complex statutory tests where linear causation models fail. The article provides guidance for selecting investigative tools that maintain legal defensibility while supporting operational resilience.
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Cvetkovski et al. (2026) studied this question.
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