Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Internet of Things (IoT) devices face security challenges arising from vulnerable software components and the difficulty of associating observed network activity with known vulnerabilities. Conventional network monitoring may identify suspicious traffic but does not necessarily provide the software inventory context required for vulnerability-specific alerts. This paper presents a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)-enhanced host-monitoring framework that correlates software inventory, vulnerability intelligence, and protocol activity to support targeted vulnerability alerts on IoT devices. The framework uses Syft to generate SBOMs, Grype and the Open Source Vulnerabilities (OSV) database to identify vulnerable software versions, and protocol-based correlation to associate runtime events with relevant Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs). A prototype was implemented and evaluated using an original Raspberry Pi 4 NTP observation, genuine WSL2 MQTT traffic, resource monitoring, and email alerting. The original single-run resource observations were 25.53% CPU utilisation and 754.8 MB memory for the proposed process, compared with 44.83% CPU and 2467.7 MB for the recorded Suricata configuration; these values are exploratory and not a controlled baseline. In the MQTT experiments, CVE-2021-41039 was matched to Mosquitto 2.0.11 and CVE-2018-12543 to version 1.5.2, while no matches were produced for the tested fixed versions 2.0.21 and 1.5.3. The mean CPU time across three trials was 7.257 s for Mosquitto 2.0.11 and 0.223 s for version 2.0.21. In the captured MQTT campaign, runtime-only correlation produced four attack-shaped alerts and SBOM gating retained two alerts applicable to vulnerable installed versions. A live WSL2 capture-to-correlation run measured 187.6 ms from packet capture to decision. These results demonstrate the feasibility of integrating SBOM-based vulnerability information with protocol monitoring to support version-aware security alerts in a bounded laboratory prototype; they do not establish general attack-detection accuracy, physical-device scalability, or broad multi-protocol CVE coverage.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jamil et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: