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This article examines how four differently positioned actors—Russia, Belarus, Euro-Atlantic institutions, and Türkiye—construct security, legitimacy, escalation, and diplomacy in official discourse on the war in Ukraine. Rather than treating hybrid warfare as a synonym for disinformation, the study approaches it as a contested strategic environment in which military, diplomatic, economic, informational, and infrastructural practices are mutually reinforcing. The analysis combines securitization theory, critical security studies, and strategic-narrative analysis to compare a bounded purposive corpus in a comparative case study of official statements and policy texts published between 24 February 2022 and 14 June 2024. The findings identify four recurrent narrative positions: defensive-revisionist securitization in Russian discourse; Russia-aligned securitization and regional vulnerability in Belarusian discourse; legal-normative securitization in NATO and European Union texts; and mediation-oriented securitization in Türkiye, where deterrence commitments coexist with sustained diplomatic engagement. Türkiye is analytically significant because it demonstrates that alignment and mediation are not mutually exclusive strategic roles. The article argues that hybrid conflict should be studied not only through competing claims about battlefield responsibility but also through the institutional production of threat, legitimate order, and permissible negotiation. The findings concern official narrative construction rather than audience acceptance or the effectiveness of securitization.
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Talya İşcan (2026) studied this question.
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