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Roelofs (2026) argues that our findings, showing that pleasant and unpleasant feelings follow Weber's law, do not support William James's theory of emotion because James excluded such feelings from his account. We address this claim by offering two clarifications. First, we argue that this conclusion rests on a mismatch between James's terminology and the terms as used in contemporary affective science. While James excluded (un)pleasant feelings from his theory, he excluded basic (un)pleasant affective qualities perceived as inherent properties of the stimulus itself, what he termed "tone of feeling," but he did not exclude valence experiences. What distinguishes between the two levels are the objects, for example, "this picture is ugly" (tone of feeling) versus "this picture makes me feel unpleasant" (valence experiences). In our experiments, participants reported about their (un)pleasant emotional state. This corresponds to what James conceptualized as a "felt state of excitement," an intense subjective state attributed to the experiencer that he explicitly identified as the defining feature of emotion rather than excluding it. Second, we clarify that our reference to James was intended to situate our findings within the broader historical tradition of perceptual theories of emotion rather than to support the specific details of his original account. Ultimately, once the terminology is aligned, it becomes clear that our results are entirely consistent with James's framework. In fact, they provide modern empirical support for his core vision: that emotions are, at their essence, perceptual processes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
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Berkovich et al. (2026) studied this question.
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