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State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have emerged as a preferred method of the government being a regulator and also involved in business activities. They serve multiple purposes such as delivering public value while remaining commercially viable. Nevertheless, these structures raise important legal questions concerning accountability, transparency, related-party transactions (RPTs) and the exercise of state control. This article examines whether the legal frameworks governing SOEs structures in Malaysia and Indonesia adequately balance between commercial autonomy with public accountability. It identifies a potential accountability gap arising from the separation between concentrated state ownership and the allocation of legal responsibility across holding companies and their subsidiaries. Employing a qualitative doctrinal legal methodology, the article analyses relevant legislation, corporate governance instruments, and regulatory requirements. Through comparative approach, the article evaluates directors' duties, ownership oversight, related-party transaction safeguards and policy channelling in both jurisdictions. It posits that ownership consolidation alone is insufficient to ensure effective accountability when oversight obligations remain fragmented across legal entities and regulatory regimes. The article proposes an integrated Accountability Allocation Framework based on ownership transparency, board independence, transaction oversight and disclosure of non-commercial public-policy mandates. It seeks to contribute to comparative corporate law scholarship by providing a legal framework for evaluating accountability in state-controlled corporate groups.
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Razak et al. (2026) studied this question.
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